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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, Minnesota became a pioneer in criminal sentencing
reform by creating the first state sentencing guidelines
1
commission. Other states followed suit and gradually enacted
2
sentencing reforms of their own. The constitutionality of these
reforms has come under increasing attack since 2000. Based on
the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of defendants’ rights
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, several states’
reformed procedures, including Minnesota’s, need further
reformation to comply with the Constitution’s guarantees.
This Note begins by briefly laying out the evolution of criminal
3
sentencing over the past century.
It then surveys judicial
interpretation of defendants’ Constitutional rights as they relate to
sentencing procedure, focusing on the Court’s recent invalidation
of Washington state’s sentencing guidelines in Blakely v.
4
Washington.
The note will then examine possible reforms to
1. See Act of Apr. 15, 1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn. Laws 761 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. ch. 244 (2004)).
2. States that have enacted sentencing guidelines and/or commissions
include Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia; Congress has also created a
federal sentencing commission and guidelines. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.125(c)–
(e), 12.55.155 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-90-801 to -804 (2003); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 6580–6581 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.001–.0016 (2001); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4701 to –4719 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. §§ 6-201 to –
216 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211E, §§ 1-4 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
769.34(2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.13 to –1340.17 (2004); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 181.21–.25 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1501, 1508, 1512
(2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.654–.673 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2151–2155,
9721 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-26-10 to -20 (Law Co-op Supp. 2003); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-101 to -114 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-25a-301 to -304
(2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2004); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994–995 (2004).
3. Infra Part II.
4. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); infra Parts III–VI.
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Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines pursuant to the Court’s
5
decision. It will conclude by advocating that, despite the recent
spotlight on Kansas’s sentencing guidelines, Minnesota’s best
response to Blakely is to return some sentencing discretion to the
6
judiciary by implementing a system of voluntary guidelines.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A. Pre-Guidelines Sentencing
Prior to the 1980s, “indeterminate sentencing” was the modus
7
operandi. Under an indeterminate system, the legislature defines
what acts constitute a crime and the maximum punishment that
8
may be imposed upon a defendant convicted of that crime. The
judiciary, on the other hand, determines a defendant’s guilt and, if
guilt is established, the judge has the power and discretion to
impose any sentence ranging from probation up to the maximum
9
punishment established by the legislature for the respective crime.
After a criminal is imprisoned, parole boards have discretion to
determine if the individual has been “rehabilitated” and is
therefore eligible for release. Thus, parole boards have the ability
10
to determine the portion of a sentence a convict actually serves.
In the early 1970s, critics of indeterminate sentencing began to
11
receive attention. One criticism of indeterminate systems was that
they did not provide sufficient overall deterrence and
incapacitation of criminals because parole boards released
criminals back into society far before the full duration of
12
sentences.
Moreover, the broad discretion judges had in
imposing sentences, in addition to the latitude parole boards had
in determining what portion of a sentence was served, caused
critics to charge that sentences were applied unfairly, based on
factors such as race, sex, and economic class, which bear no
5. Infra Part VIII.
6. Infra Part IX.
7. Richard Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ.
1, 7 (1993) (citing 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 1–4
(Alfred Blumenstein et al. eds., 1983)).
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 973.013(1)(a) (1998).
10. Frase, The Uncertain Future, supra note 7, at 7.
11. Id. at 7–8.
12. Id. at 8.
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relation to culpability or the harm caused by a given crime.
B. Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines

In response to such criticism, the Minnesota Legislature
created the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
14
(MSGC). The MSGC ultimately created a grid that establishes a
presumptive sentence for convicted felons based on the seriousness
of the offense (as determined by the MSGC) and a defendant’s
prior criminal record. The grid presently has eleven “severity
levels” on the vertical axis and seven “criminal history scores” on
15
the horizontal axis. After determining the appropriate severity
level and criminal history score, a defendant can ascertain the
“presumed” sentence at the intersection of two scores on the grid.
The thick black line running across the middle of the grid
represents the “disposition line.” The numbers in the boxes below
the line represent the presumptive length of a stayed sentence, in
which a period of probation is presumed appropriate for the
defendant. Stayed sentences are not served unless the defendant
16
violates the terms of probation so that the stay is revoked. The
boxes above the disposition line represent presumed prison
sentences. In addition to the presumed sentence, each box above
the disposition includes a small range of numbers that represents a
sentence the MSGC deems appropriate in most cases and is
17
therefore “within” the Guidelines.
The legislature labels the Guidelines as “advisory” and states
13. Id.
14. MINN. STAT. § 244.09 (2004). The Commission’s goal is to establish and
maintain a system that: (1) promotes uniform, proportional sentences for
convicted felons; (2) helps ensure that sentencing decisions are not influenced by
factors such as race, gender, or the exercise of constitutional rights by the
defendant; and (3) allocates the finite correctional resources to the most serious
offenders. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § I (2002).
15. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § IV (2002). For example, the presumed
sentence for a defendant convicted of first degree aggravated robbery (severity
level = VIII) with no prior criminal history (criminal history score = 0) is forty-eight
months, with a Guidelines range of forty-four to fifty-two months. Id. At the
extreme, a defendant convicted of a crime with a severity level of XI and criminal
history score of six or more faces a presumed sentence of 426 months, with a
Guidelines range of 419 to 433 months. Id.
16. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II, subd. D.
17. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § IV (shaded boxes indicating
presumptive stayed sentence). This Note will capitalize “Guidelines” when
referring specifically to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. All other references
to guidelines will use the lowercase.
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that sentencing within them is “not a right that accrues to a
18
A judge may issue a sentence outside the
convicted felon.”
Guidelines’ range when a case involves “substantial and compelling
19
circumstances.” In the event of such a departure, the judge must
make written findings of facts explaining the reasons for the
20
sentence.
Despite its “advisory” nature, the sentence provided by the grid
21
is presumed to be appropriate for every case and judges are
22
required to follow the Guidelines’ procedures. Also, although the
statutes are silent on the matter, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
determined that not following the Guidelines’ procedures is cause
23
for overturning a sentence.
24
Finally, the Guidelines require “truth-in-sentencing,” which is
essential to achieving the Guidelines’ third goal of effective
allocation of correctional resources. In Minnesota, this means that
every “executed” sentence—in which a defendant spends time in
prison either as initially sentenced or after revocation of a stayed
sentence—“consists of two parts: (1) a specified minimum term of
imprisonment that is equal to two-thirds of the executed sentence;
and (2) a specified maximum supervised release term that is equal
25
to one-third of the executed sentence.” The supervised release
period is similar to a parole term under an indeterminate
18. MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5. The quoted language was added in 1997 in
response to State v. Givens. See Act of May 6, 1997, ch. 96, 1997 Minn. Laws 694,
695 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ch. 244 (2004)); State v. Givens, 544
N.W.2d 774, 775 (Minn. 1996) (stating that a defendant has a right to be
sentenced in accordance with the Guidelines, which may only be waived
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently).
19. MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subd. 2. Factors that are not valid reasons for a
departure include race, sex, or employment status. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ II, subd. D. Factors that may warrant an upward departure (“aggravating
factors”) include, but are not limited to: selecting a victim that is “particularly
vulnerable,” treating a victim with “particular cruelty,” committing a felony for
hire, committing a crime as part of a group of three or more, or committing a
“hate crime.” Id.
20. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II, subd. D.
21. Id.
22. MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5.
23. State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn. 2003) (noting that if a judge
does not find facts justifying a sentencing departure and state the reasons for
departure on the record at the time of sentencing, no departure is allowed)
(citing Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985)).
24. See MINN. STAT. § 244.101, subd. 1 (mandating minimum term of
imprisonment).
25. Id.
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26

sentencing scheme.
However, the required minimum term of
imprisonment has allowed state officials to more accurately project
future prison populations because the discrepancy in length
between criminals’ sentences and the time actually spent in prison
has been reduced and regulated. These projections then help state
officials to effectively allocate finite resources and avoid problems
27
associated with overcrowded prisons.
C. Developments Pursuant to Minnesota’s Guidelines
The Guidelines’ overall success in achieving the MSGC’s stated
28
goals is documented and demonstrated by their longevity as well
as the lack of any appreciable movement to replace them. The
29
number of states that subsequently enacted sentencing guidelines
also indicates the MSGC’s success and the important nature of the
goals it seeks to achieve. While some states enacted sentencing
30
guidelines clearly modeled after Minnesota’s, others enacted
31
schemes with different salient features.
Of course, guideline
systems can include some, but not all, features of Minnesota’s
scheme; for example, Virginia’s guidelines are voluntary, but the
32
state has implemented truth-in-sentencing for convicted felons.
Nonetheless, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines have proven to

26. Frase, The Uncertain Future, supra note 7, at 6.
27. Id. at 36–37.
28. See Richard Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The
Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279 (1993);
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 24–64 (1996).
29. See Frase, The Uncertain Future, supra note 7, at 2 n. 1 (listing fourteen states
with commission-based sentencing guidelines as of 1993); see also supra note 2
(listing seventeen states other than Minnesota with commissions and/or
guidelines in place).
30. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.010–.637 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 214701–29 (1995).
31. For example, rather than a grid, some states utilize a point system or a
narrative format to establish a presumptive sentence or sentence range. See, e.g.,
www.vcsc.state.va.us/worksheets.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4205 (2001). Further, in contrast to Minnesota, some states’ systems are
voluntary rather than presumptive; i.e., judges are free to depart from the
guidelines’ suggested sentences in all cases and defendants have no recourse on
appeal by virtue of a sentencing judge’s departure from the guidelines. See, e.g.,
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-212 (2001);
UTAH S. CT. R. pt. II app. D.
32. The Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission produced a brochure
advertising the salutary effects of its truth-in-sentencing, which is available from its
web site, at www.vcsc.state.va.us/ReptCdPDFfinal.pdf.
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be an overall success and have helped spawn various forms of
guidelines that have served as tools in criminal sentencing across
the nation.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
A. Historical Background—Williams v. New York
Any examination of criminal procedure requires a
simultaneous exploration of constitutional law. Williams v. New York
is a landmark case that embodies the intersection of the two
33
topics. A jury found Mr. Williams guilty of first-degree murder
34
and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. The judge,
however, sentenced him to death, citing the defendant’s history of
burglaries and morbid sexuality as reasons for disregarding the
35
jury’s recommendation. The defendant had never been charged
with, much less convicted of, the burglaries cited by the judge
36
The defendant also never received an
during sentencing.
37
opportunity to refute the assertion of his morbid sexuality.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the capital sentence
against a due process challenge because, under New York’s
indeterminate sentencing scheme, the judge could have sentenced
38
Mr. Williams to death providing no reason at all. Therefore, the
Court reasoned, the sentence should not become void merely
because the sentencing judge considered the additional out-ofcourt information to assist him in the exercise of judicial discretion
39
in imposing the death sentence.
Thus, the Supreme Court
generally recognized the constitutionality of broad judicial
discretion in sentencing.
B. Welcome to “Apprendi-land”
Almost forty years after Williams, the Court reexamined the
permissible extent of judicial sentencing discretion in Apprendi v.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

337 U.S. 241 (1949).
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id. at 244.
Id.
Id. at 251–52.
Id. at 252.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 7
KUHN

4/28/2005 11:44:05 AM

1514

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:4

40

New Jersey.
In a plea agreement, Mr. Apprendi pled guilty to
unlawful possession of a firearm arising from an incident in which
he fired several bullets into the home of an African-American
41
family. The maximum sentence allowable by state statute for the
42
However, a
firearm offense was between five and ten years.
separate “hate crime” statute provided for an extended term of
imprisonment if the judge found by a preponderance of the
evidence that, in committing the crime, the defendant acted with a
43
purpose to intimidate a group of people because of race. The
hate crime provision doubled the maximum sentence allowable for
44
the firearms offense to a term between ten and twenty years.
The trial judge found during sentencing that the shooting was
motivated by racial bias and sentenced Mr. Apprendi to twelve
years in prison for the firearms offense—two years longer than
45
otherwise permissible by law. The state appellate and supreme
46
However, on certiorari, the Supreme Court,
courts affirmed.
divided five-to-four, ruled that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments invalidated the extended sentence. The majority
opinion announced that “any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,” other than the
fact of a prior conviction, “must be submitted to a jury and proven
47
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Because Mr. Apprendi’s extended
sentence resulted from a finding of racial bias by the judge using
48
the preponderance of the evidence standard, it did not stand.
The Court further stated that, in analyzing whether the

40. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
41. Id. at 469–70. The defendant also pled guilty on two other counts, for
which he received concurrent sentences that are irrelevant for purposes of the
holding’s constitutional analysis. See id. at 474.
42. Id. at 468 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (1995)).
43. Id. at 468–69. The applicable statute provided:
The court may, upon application of the prosecuting attorney, sentence a
person who has been convicted of a crime of the first, second or third
degree to an extended term of imprisonment if it finds . . . [t]he
defendant in committing the crime acted, at least in part, with ill will,
hatred or bias toward, and with a purpose to intimidate, an individual or
group of individuals because of race, color, religion, sexual orientation
or ethnicity.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (1995).
44. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (1995)).
45. Id. at 471.
46. Id. at 471–72.
47. Id. at 490.
48. Id. at 497.
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protections of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt apply,
the relevant inquiry is “one not of form, but of effect;” that is,
courts should ask if a required factual finding exposes the
defendant to a punishment greater than that authorized by the
49
jury’s guilty verdict. If the answer is yes, the Constitution affords a
defendant both protections.
C. Apprendi’s Progeny
The scope of Apprendi was not immediately clear. In Gould v.
50
State, the Kansas Supreme Court examined Apprendi in light of the
state’s sentencing guidelines, which were modeled after
Minnesota’s. The jury convicted the defendant, Crystal Gould, on
51
three counts of child abuse.
Given the statutorily classified
severity of the crime and her criminal history, Ms. Gould’s
presumptive guideline sentence was thirty-two months for each
52
count, with a standard range of thirty-one to thirty-four months.
However, upon the state’s motion, the district court judge departed
from the guidelines because the victims were particularly
vulnerable, the defendant’s conduct was excessively brutal, and the
53
defendant had a special relationship with the victims. The court
imposed an effective 136-month sentence on two counts, which was
the maximum sentence the judge could impose under Kansas’s
54
statutes.
The Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the extended sentence
49. Id. at 494.
50. 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001).
51. Id. at 806.
52. Id.
53. Id. Kansas statutes provided:
The sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence provided by
the sentencing guidelines . . . unless the judge finds substantial and
compelling reasons to impose a departure. If the sentencing judge
departs from the presumptive sentence, the judge shall state on the
record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons
for the departure.
KAN. STAT. § 21-4716(a) (1995). The reasons cited by the sentencing judge for
upward departure from the guidelines were specifically enunciated aggravating
factors under section 21-4716(b)(2). The victims in the case were particularly
vulnerable because they were all under two years of age at the time of the
incidents. Further, because all the victims were Ms. Gould’s children, she had a
special relationship with them. Gould, 23 P.3d at 806.
54. Gould, 23 P.3d at 806. Ms. Gould received a thirty-four month sentence
on the third count, to run concurrent with the other two sentences, which is not
relevant for purposes of the court’s Apprendi analysis.
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on the ground that the statute providing for upward departures was
55
unconstitutional pursuant to Apprendi. The jury’s verdict alone
exposed the defendant to a sentence up to thirty-four months on
56
each count.
The 136-month sentence resulted from the judge
finding the existence of aggravating circumstances. Because the
aggravating factors exposed the defendant to a sentence greater
than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict—that is, a sentence
within the guidelines—the court reasoned that Apprendi requires
the State to prove the aggravating factors to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt and not to the sentencing judge by a
57
preponderance of the evidence. Thus, for Apprendi purposes, the
court deemed the “prescribed statutory maximum” under the
Kansas guidelines to be the uppermost sentence within the range
provided by the guidelines’ grid.
Minnesota interpreted Apprendi’s scope differently. In State v.
Dean, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree attempted
58
murder.
The judge granted the state’s motion for an upward
durational departure from the Guidelines, issuing a sentence of
59
240 months on that count. The defendant asserted an Apprendi
defense because a judge, not the jury, found the aggravating factors
justifying the departure from the Guidelines. The court summarily
dismissed this defense, stating that Apprendi applies only with
respect to the statutory maximum—not the sentencing-grid
60
maximum—for the applicable crime; because the statutory
61
maximum for attempted first-degree murder was twenty years, the
sentence did not exceed the “prescribed statutory maximum” and
Apprendi did not apply.
Two years after Apprendi, the Supreme Court examined the
62
case’s rule as applied to Arizona’s death penalty procedure. In
Ring v. Arizona, a jury convicted Timothy Ring of felony murder
occurring in the course of armed robbery, but acquitted him on
the alternative charge of premeditated murder because the

55. Id. at 813.
56. Id. at 806.
57. Id. at 813. The court also refused to recognize the State’s argument that
the principles of harmless error should be applied because neither party disputed
the aggravating factors cited by the judge. Id. at 814.
58. No. C4-02-1225, 2003 WL 21321425, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 10, 2003).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See MINN. STAT. § 609.17, subd. 4 (2004).
62. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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evidence at trial failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
actually participated in the murder of an armed truck guard that
63
occurred during the robbery.
The statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder was
64
death. However, Mr. Ring was not eligible for the death penalty
by virtue of the jury’s conviction; rather, the sentencing judge, in a
hearing before the court alone, could impose the death penalty
only if the judge found the existence of at least one aggravating
65
circumstance and no significant mitigating circumstances. The
judge sentenced Mr. Ring to death after concluding that Mr. Ring
66
killed the guard and that two aggravating factors were present.
The Court reversed the death sentence, focusing on the
instruction in Apprendi that the relevant inquiry is one of form, not
67
effect. While the maximum statutory penalty for the first-degree
murder charge was death, that punishment could only be imposed
if an aggravating fact was found to be present. Therefore, the
effect of the judge’s finding of “aggravating” facts was to expose the
defendant to a greater sentence than that authorized by the jury’s
68
verdict, which Apprendi does not allow. The sentence could not
stand unless Mr. Ring was afforded the procedural safeguards of
having a jury find the existence of an aggravating fact beyond a
reasonable doubt.
IV. BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON
A. Facts and Procedure
Ring set the stage for the Court’s decision in Blakely v.
Washington, which considered Apprendi’s effect on presumptive

63. Id. at 591–92.
64. Id. at 592 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(C) (2001)).
65. Id. at 592–93 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F) (2001)).
66. Id. at 594–95. The judge found that Mr. Ring killed the guard to receive
something of pecuniary value and acted in an especially cruel manner in doing so.
Id. Both reasons are statutorily enumerated aggravating factors under Arizona’s
capital punishment statute. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F) (2001).
67. Ring, 536 U.S. at 586, 602.
68. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg chided Justice Breyer’s
dissenting opinion in Ring, characterized the holding in Ring as the logical result
of Apprendi’s rule, and stated, “[c]oncisely put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong
flight; he should either get off before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Apprendiland.” Id. at 613.
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69

sentencing guidelines schemes.
The defendant, a paranoid
schizophrenic, accosted his wife at knifepoint, bound her with duct
70
tape, forced her into a wooden box, and abducted her.
71
The State charged Mr. Blakely with first-degree kidnapping.
However, the parties reached an agreement under which he pled
guilty to second-degree kidnapping (a class B felony), domestic
72
violence, and firearms allegations. Washington statutes stated that
no person convicted of a class B felony could be sentenced to a
73
prison term exceeding ten years.
The state’s sentencing
guidelines provided that Mr. Blakely faced a sentence with a
74
Under
standard range of forty-nine to fifty-three months.
Washington’s guidelines, the judge could depart from the standard
range for “substantial and compelling reasons,” which had to be set
75
forth in written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The State recommended a sentence within the standard
76
range. However, after hearing Mrs. Blakely’s description of the
incident, the judge departed from the guidelines and issued a
sentence of ninety months, based on his finding that the defendant
77
acted with deliberate cruelty. The state appellate court affirmed
78
79
the conviction and the state supreme court denied review.

69. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
70. Id. at 2534.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2534–35.
73. Id. at 2535 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(1)(b) (2000)).
74. Id.
75. Id. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2000).
76. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
77. Id. “Deliberate cruelty” in a domestic violence incident is a specifically
enumerated aggravating circumstance justifying departure from the sentencing
guidelines. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(2)(h)(iii) (2000). Had Mr. Blakely
been convicted of first-degree kidnapping, which is the offense the State originally
charged, he would have faced a sentence with a standard range of seventy-five to
ninety-five months (given his criminal history and a firearms enhancement). The
irony of the situation is that second-degree kidnapping, when done with deliberate
cruelty, is the logical equivalent of first-degree kidnapping. The fact that the
aggravated sentence imposed falls within the standard range for first-degree
kidnapping highlights this oddity. Mr. Blakely almost certainly pled guilty to the
lesser offense with the hope of avoiding a sentence in the seventy-five to ninetymonth range.
78. State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
79. State v. Blakely, 62 P.3d 889 (Wash. 2003).
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B. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation
80

On certiorari, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated
that Ring made clear that the “prescribed statutory maximum” for
Apprendi purposes is not the uppermost penalty permitted by law for
81
a given crime (ten years in Mr. Blakely’s case). Rather, it is the
maximum penalty a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant; in
Blakely’s case, that meant fifty-three months, the uppermost end of
82
Because Mr.
the Washington guidelines’ “standard range.”
Blakely’s sentence exceeded the standard range based on the
judge’s finding of deliberate cruelty (a fact neither admitted by Mr.
Blakely nor found by the jury), the sentence ran afoul of Apprendi
83
and its progeny.
The majority’s justification for its holding represents a classic
example of originalist Constitutional interpretation. Although the
framers never conceived of a guidelines-like system for meting out
84
criminal punishment, they did guarantee, through the Sixth
80. The Court in Blakely split 5-4 along the same lines it did in Apprendi.
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg formed the majority, while
Justices Breyer, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. The
somewhat odd sides of the debate, in which normally conservative Justices Scalia
and Thomas sided with three more liberal colleagues to form a majority, indicates
that the Apprendi issue was focused more on the vision of the jury versus practical
considerations, rather than simply political ideology. It should also be noted that
the Court in Ring split 7-2. Justice Kennedy begrudgingly joined the five
“Apprendi” justices, stating that, although Apprendi was wrongly decided, Apprendi
represents the law of the land and Mr. Ring’s case presented a “clear” application
of Apprendi’s rule. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). While still rejecting the holding in Apprendi, Justice Breyer
concurred with the Ring majority’s judgment on the ground that the Eighth
Amendment mandates jury sentencing in capital sentences. Id. at 613–14 (Breyer,
J., concurring). In her dissent, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, unequivocally stated she would overrule Apprendi, a holding she
believed “was a serious mistake.” Id. at 619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538. Justice Scalia emphatically stated, “[t]he
‘maximum sentence’ is no more 10 years here [in Blakely] than it was 20 years in
Apprendi (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding a hate
crime) or death in Ring (because that is what the judge could have imposed upon
finding an aggravator).” Id.
82. Id. at 2537. Throughout the remainder of this Note, the uppermost
sentence provided by a presumptive sentencing guideline scheme will be referred
to as the “prescribed statutory maximum.” The maximum sentence allowable by
law for a given crime pursuant to an upward departure from a guidelines scheme
will be referred to as the “statutory maximum.”
83. Id. at 2537–38.
84. Judicial sentencing discretion in early America was largely non-existent:
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Amendment, the right to trial by a jury in criminal prosecutions.
The Court’s task was to determine the substance of that guarantee
in light of Washington’s presumptive guidelines.
The majority first offered, as historical support for its
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, quotations from Sir
William Blackstone (“the ‘truth of every accusation’ against a
defendant ‘should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous
85
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours’”) and Joel
Prentiss Bishop (“an accusation which lacks any particular fact
which the law makes essential to the punishment is
. . . no accusation within the requirements of the common law, and
86
it is no accusation in reason”). The accusation that Mr. Blakely
acted with deliberate cruelty was essential to his punishment
because it was necessary to sustain an aggravated departure. Had
Bishop lived long enough to witness the implementation of
Washington’s guidelines, seemingly he would have required that
Mr. Blakely be apprised of that accusation prior to his sentencing
hearing. Presumably, the majority quoted Sir Blackstone to lend
legitimacy to its conclusion that the guarantee embodied in the
Sixth Amendment was intended to require that the “accusation” of
deliberate cruelty be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition to historical sources, the majority buttressed its
rigid interpretation of Apprendi by presenting it as the only sensible
understanding of the right embodied in the Sixth Amendment’s
87
language.
To demonstrate the holding’s logic, Justice Scalia
contrasted the majority’s bright-line rule with two possible
alternatives. First, the Court could require that a jury only need
determine the facts the legislature chooses to designate as elements
of a crime and leave all other facts to be “sentencing factors” that a
88
judge could find. Theoretically, this could allow a jury to find that
a defendant, for example, made an illegal lane change, but allow
“[S]tate legislatures commonly set a specific period of incarceration for each
offense. As in England, the real sentencers continued to be the jurors by way of
their verdicts.” Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951,
964–65 (2003).
85. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
343).
86. Id. (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d
ed. 1872)).
87. Id. at 2538 (urging that the Court’s “commitment to Apprendi in this
context reflects not just respect for longstanding precedent, but the need to give
intelligible content to the right of jury trial”).
88. Id. at 2539.
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the judge to find as a “sentencing factor” that the infraction was
made in fleeing the scene of a murder the driver just committed,
89
meriting a hefty punishment from the court.
The obvious
absurdity of such a result, the majority reasoned, demonstrates a
(theoretically) possible emasculation of the Sixth Amendment.
Alternatively, courts could defer to legislatures’ designation of
elements of a crime—which must be found by a jury—and
sentencing factors—which can be found by a judge—within a
90
“logical” framework. The problem with such a flexible approach
91
is that its subjectivity could make it difficult to apply. Ultimately,
the majority determined that, for the Sixth Amendment’s text to
have true, clear substance, its bright-line approach in Blakely was
92
the best possible interpretation.
Having defended the logic behind the Court’s extension of
Apprendi, the majority next reconciled its holding with its earlier
decision in Williams. In Blakely, the State attempted to have the
extended sentence upheld by drawing an analogy between the
broad discretion in sentencing permitted by the Williams court and
the discretion exercised by Washington’s sentencing judge in
93
finding deliberate cruelty.
Logically, the constitutionality of
broad judicial fact-finding allowed in Williams (under an
indeterminate scheme) should extend to allow a similar
94
discretionary exercise in the context of sentencing guidelines.
That the two sentences were promulgated pursuant to two different
systems—one indeterminate, the other determinate—is an obvious
basis for distinction.
However, the Court engaged in a deeper analysis of the Sixth
Amendment, explaining that the right to trial by jury is not
categorically a limitation of judicial power; rather, it is a reservation
95
of power to the jury. The limitation on judicial power is merely a
function of the jury’s province to find all facts essential to
96
determining a defendant’s sentence. Under an indeterminate
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2540.
93. Brief for the State of Washington at 10–12, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.
Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632).
94. See Jane A. Dall, Note, A Question for Another Day: The Constitutionality of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1617, 1673 (2003).
95. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540.
96. Id.
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sentencing scheme, once a jury establishes guilt, the defendant has
no legal right to any sentence less than the statutory maximum for
the given crime. Although the finding of additional facts beyond
the statutorily prescribed elements of the crime influence a
defendant’s sentence, the additional facts are not essential to the
sentence imposed. In contrast, under presumptive sentencing
guidelines, a finding of deliberate cruelty is essential to the sentence
imposed because an upward departure cannot be sustained without
such a finding. According to the majority, the Sixth Amendment’s
language and the jury’s historical role require juries to perform
their traditional function of finding such an essential fact.
V. BLAKELY’S EFFECT ON THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
There is no shortage of rhetoric trumpeting Blakely’s
97
significance. Without doubt, the Court’s decision will attract the
attention of legal scholars for years to come as its scope and
application are clarified. Blakely’s most significant ramification in
Minnesota will be a restructuring of the state’s procedure for
imposing upward departures from the Guidelines’ standard range.
The similarities between Minnesota’s Guidelines and the guidelines
struck down in Blakely are great. Both schemes allow judges to
98
determine the existence of “substantial and compelling”
aggravating circumstances justifying departure from the guidelines.
Both require judges to set forth reasons for departure in “written
99
findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Both direct sentencing
100
judges to follow the guidelines, and judges who disregard the
guidelines face reversal of the aggravated sentence. While the
Minnesota guideline ranges are administratively produced, a basis
97. E.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Speech to annual conference of Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals (July 22, 2004) (analogizing Blakely to “a number 10
earthquake”); MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF BLAKELY V.
WASHINGTON ON SENTENCING IN MINNESOTA: LONG TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 19
(2004) [hereinafter MSGC LONG TERM RECOMMENDATIONS] (“[Blakely] has created
a level of confusion and uncertainty that has never previously been experienced in
the area of criminal sentencing.”), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/
Data%20Reports/blakely_longterm.pdf.
98. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (West 2003) with MINN.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II, subd. D (2002) (using substantially the same
verbiage).
99. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (West 2003) with MINN. STAT.
§ 244.10, subd. 2 (2004) (using substantially the same verbiage).
100. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.505(2)(a)(i) (West 2003) with
MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2004).
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for distinction from Washington’s codified guidelines, the practical
similarities regarding judicial fact-finding make the administrative
distinction constitutionally insignificant and cause Minnesota’s
Guidelines to violate defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights
101
recognized in Blakely.
Despite the rhetoric surrounding Blakely, however, the aspects
of criminal sentencing the decision does not cover are extensive.
First, Blakely does not require any change to Minnesota’s present
procedure for downward departures. By its terms, the rule
announced in Apprendi and extended by Blakely only pertains to
facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
102
statutory maximum. Further, voluntary sentencing guidelines are
unaffected by Blakely. By virtue of their voluntary nature, judges—
though discouraged from doing so—have always remained free to
impose any punishment up to the statutory maximum regardless of
guideline suggestions without finding any essential facts. In
addition, Blakely does not affect the states using indeterminate
sentencing. The majority specifically distinguished indeterminate
103
sentencing from the guidelines at hand in Blakely and indicated
no inclination to overturn its decision in Williams. Finally, the
Court expressly recognized that determinate sentencing schemes
like Minnesota’s are not per se unconstitutional; sentencing
104
guidelines can continue to exist in the post-Blakely era.
The majority opinion recognizes the value of the goals that led
to the enactment of sentencing guidelines in Minnesota and other
states. The Court intimated that the proper question to ask need
not be, “What should replace sentencing guidelines?” Rather, the
proper question may simply be, “How can Minnesota’s Guidelines
101. The MSGC quickly recognized the weakness of the administrative
distinction and never attempted to have the Guidelines upheld on that basis. In a
report for Governor Tim Pawlenty shortly after the Blakely decision, the MSGC
unequivocally concludes that the decision affected the procedure pertaining to
aggravated departures and a new procedure for such departures needs to be
implemented. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF BLAKELY V.
WASHINGTON ON SENTENCING IN MINNESOTA: SHORT TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 1
(2004) [hereinafter MSGC SHORT TERM RECOMMENDATIONS], available at
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Data%20Reports/blakely_shortterm.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 27, 2005). In the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the
United States Supreme Court confirmed that the administrative distinction has no
constitutional validity. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 752 (2005).
102. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004) (quoting Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
103. Id. at 2538; see infra Part VI.A.
104. Id. at 2540.
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be implemented in a manner that complies with the constitutional
105
rights recognized in Blakely?”
VI. SENTENCING AFTER BLAKELY
Achieving uniformity and proportionality in sentencing while
effectively allocating prison resources—the goals set forth by the
106
107
Legislature and the MSGC —remains an important task. The
Guidelines’ approximate twenty-five-year existence has effectively
established these goals as a reflection of Minnesota’s public policy
in criminal sentencing. The present task is to determine how, in a
post-Blakely environment, Minnesota can enact a constitutionally
viable sentencing scheme that functions similarly to the current
incarnation of the Guidelines and continues to effectively achieve
the Guidelines’ goals. In his dissent in Blakely, Justice Breyer
identified several sentencing procedure options that states might
108
adopt in Blakely’s wake.
A. Justice Breyer’s Alternatives
1.

Return to Indeterminate Sentencing

First, as Justice Breyer suggests, Minnesota could entirely
abandon its Guidelines and the MSGC, and simply return to
109
indeterminate sentencing with a parole board.
Unfortunately,
there is no logical reason to expect that the unpredictable,
disparate, and idiosyncratic sentences that previously characterized
the system would not accompany the scheme’s return. A majority
of states have retained indeterminate sentencing. Indeterminacy’s
persistence, however, seems to reflect states’ reluctance to replace a
long-entrenched system rather than to indicate any significant
degree of success in doling out equitable punishments or
110
rehabilitating criminals.
In light of Minnesota’s goals, better
105. Id. “This case is not about whether determinate sentencing is
constitutional, only about how it can be implemented in a way that respects the
Sixth Amendment.” Id.
106. MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2004).
107. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § I (2002).
108. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2551–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2553–54.
110. Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in
SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 222, 232 (Michael Tonry &
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alternatives exist to ensure that the undesirable side effects of
indeterminate sentencing do not return to the state.
2.

Adopt “Pure” Determinate Sentencing

“Pure” determinate sentencing is another, equally unpalatable,
111
option posited by Justice Breyer. Such a system uses a handful of
essential facts to define a crime; all defendants convicted of a crime
receive the same sentence. For example, under a simple murder
statute, the killer who captures and tortures his victim as part of a
murder-for-hire plan is deemed to have committed the same
crime—and receives the same penalty—as a person who plans and
murders, say, a former abuser. Proportionality between the
seriousness and culpability of one’s acts and the punishment
imposed is clearly lost in such a system. While guidelines were
aimed to reduce disparity in sentencing that occurs when similarly
situated criminals receive different sentences, an equally
unacceptable disparity occurs when differently situated criminals
receive the same sentence. “Pure” determinate sentencing creates
exactly that type of disparity by examining only a very limited
number of facts. Therefore, like indeterminate sentencing, pure
determinacy is also an unacceptable response to Blakely.
These first two options, indeterminate and pure determinate
sentencing, focus on replacing, rather than altering, the present
guideline system. Implementing these options would cause an
intolerable possibility for disparate and disproportional sentencing.
As the majority stated, sentencing guidelines need not be scrapped
entirely, but could be altered to comply with a defendant’s
constitutional rights. The question remains—what would such
alterations entail?
3.

Adjust the Upper Ranges of the Guidelines

Justice Breyer identified a third alternative that would, for
Minnesota, involve changing the Guidelines’ ranges by greatly
increasing the maximum end of each range, effectively making
upward departures unnecessary. Meanwhile, the current Guideline
minimums and the procedure for downward departures would
112
remain unaffected by Blakely.
This option would be a large step
Richard Frase eds., 2001).
111. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2552–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2558. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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in the direction of indeterminate sentencing: the arbitrariness of
“tough” judges would no longer be checked by an effective upward
limit in sentencing “typical” felons, but “softer” judges would still
be constrained by the Guidelines. Although this alternative does
not abandon the current determinate system, it reintroduces many
of the problems of indeterminate sentencing because sentences
“within” the Guidelines could be inexplicably and widely disparate
due to the broad range of sentences that would be included in the
grid’s revised standard ranges. Such a system would be an
improvement on indeterminate sentencing only in proportion to
the lack of “hard-on-crime” judges in the state. Overall, this
approach is a blatant—but permissible—end-run around Apprendi
and Blakely that would present a serious potential for numerous
arbitrary and disproportionate sentences.
Therefore, this
alternative should not be adopted.
4.

Ask the Jury to Consider “Aggravating Factors”

A fourth option Justice Breyer identified to make sentencing
guidelines conform with Apprendi’s dictates is to maintain the
present guideline system, but alter the guidelines to force
prosecutors to charge “aggravating factors” to a jury and prove
113
them beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Breyer cites two ways
114
this option could be implemented.
First, the legislature could amend its statutes to incorporate
each fact previously considered an “aggravating sentencing factor”
into the definition of a crime. For example, Minnesota’s present
115
controlled substance statutes could be amended to create further
degrees (from the present five) based upon: (1) the number of
transactions in which the defendant has sold drugs; (2) the
defendant’s possession of a firearm during the sale; (3) the size of
the geographic area in which the defendant has distributed drugs;
and/or (4) the defendant’s position in the drug dealing
116
hierarchy. Each crime would be assigned its own severity level on
the Guidelines grid with a presumptive sentence.
A potential problem with such a system, identified by Justice
Breyer, is that some of the facts that are part of the newly defined

113.
114.
115.
116.

See id. at 2554.
Id.
See MINN. STAT. §§ 152.021–025 (2004).
See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II, subd. D.b(5)(a)–(g) (2002).
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crime may not come to light until the time of trial, resulting in a
charge that does not accurately reflect the crime actually
117
committed.
In addition, implementing such highly calibrated
criminal statutes could place defendants in prejudicial positions at
trial if they choose to contest all of the facts in the charge,
including the aggravating facts incorporated into the criminal
118
statutes.
For example, a defendant who is charged under a
revised controlled substance statute might contest that (s)he did
not sell drugs; but, if (s)he did, it was only a few transactions,
any/all of which occurred in the narrow confines of one
neighborhood because (s)he was not a kingpin, but merely a local
peddler. Defendants contesting all the facts in the complex charge
could suffer a critical blow to credibility that would accompany
assuming radically inconsistent positions at the same trial before
the same jury. Nonetheless, defendants would want to contest each
fact because all would be relevant to the punishment imposed.
A second way to allow aggravating factors to be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt is to require two juries for each
119
defendant whenever an aggravating factor is present.
One jury
would determine guilt of the crime charged and a second jury
120
would try the disputed facts constituting an aggravating factor.
The obvious issue with such a system is the increased costs in time,
121
Due to the
money, and resources that bifurcated trials incur.
cost, states have reserved such a procedure only for those cases in
122
which the most severe penalty, death, is to be imposed.
B. Two Paths Through the Apprendi-Woods (The “Kansas Solution”
and Voluntary Guidelines)
1. Kansas—Making Sentencing Guidelines Work in Response to
Apprendi and Gould
Subsequent to the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
123
that state’s legislature had to amend its sentencing
Gould,
117. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For example, the fact
that the defendant sold drugs all over the state, rather than simply within a city’s
limits, may not come to light until testimony at trial.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2556.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001).
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guidelines to comply with Blakely. The legislature ultimately passed
124
slight amendments to the state’s statutes, which maintain its
guidelines, allow for departures, comply with defendant’s
constitutional rights to a jury trial, and avoid, to a certain extent,
several problems associated with a Blakely-compliant scheme as
identified by Justice Breyer.
First, the Kansas legislature created an exception to the
previous sentencing procedure, which mandated that judges
impose the presumptive sentence unless the judge found
substantial and compelling reasons and stated the reasons on the
125
record.
The exception applied only in respect of “fact[s] that
would increase the penalty for a crime beyond the [sentencing
guidelines’ prescribed] statutory maximum, other than a prior
126
conviction.”
Such facts have to be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt in accordance with the amended procedure set
127
forth in section 21-4718.
The procedure for downward
departures remained unchanged.
In amending section 21-4718, the legislature mandated that, in
order to obtain an upward departure, a prosecutor must file a
motion with the court to seek an upward departure thirty days
128
prior to trial.
If the trial is to take place in less than thirty days,
the motion is to be filed within five days from the date of
129
Aggravating facts that do not come to light before
arraignment.
trial cannot be introduced to the jury at any time or serve as a basis
130
for departure.
The procedure for allowing a jury to find aggravating facts can
then take one of two forms. First, the prosecutor can present
evidence of the aggravating fact at trial and have the jury
unanimously find the existence of the alleged fact beyond a
131
reasonable doubt in a manner similar to a special verdict form.
Alternatively, if the court determines that “justice so requires,” a
separate sentencing departure proceeding may be conducted as
132
soon as practicable after the phase of trial establishing guilt. Any
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See 2002 Kan. Sess. Laws 170.
See id.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b) (1995 & West Supp. 2002).
Id.; see also id. § 21-4718(b)(2).
See id. § 21-4718(b)(1).
Id.
Id. § 21-4718(b)(5).
Id. § 21-4718(b)(4).
Id. § 21-4718(b)(2)–(4).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/7

22

Kuhn: Note: The Earthquake that Will Move Sentencing Discretion Back to
KUHN

2005]

4/28/2005 11:44:05 AM

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

1529

person who served on the jury during the guilt-phase of the trial,
but is unable to serve for a departure hearing, is replaced by an
alternate juror originally impaneled for the guilt-phase of the
133
trial.
If such alternates have been exhausted, the departure
sentence can proceed so long as the jury is comprised of at least six
134
jurors.
The right to have a jury determine aggravating facts can
be waived; and if the right to have a jury determine innocence or
guilt is waived, the statute provides that a defendant has also waived
the right to have a jury determine the presence or absence of
135
aggravating facts.
In addition to retaining the discretion to decide whether to
conduct a separate departure proceeding or have the aggravating
facts determined along with guilt, judges are able to determine
whether a specified fact warrants an upward departure in the event
a factor is not included in the non-exclusive statutory list of
136
aggravating factors.
Discretion in these two areas is important.
By not requiring a bifurcated trial in all departure cases, Kansas has
attempted to create a system that minimizes the costs of complying
with defendant’s Apprendi rights. Judges, relying on their training,
are entrusted with the power to disallow a single trial with a special
verdict form when doing so would cause Justice Breyer’s fear of
prejudicial trials to be realized. Furthermore, judges are able to
tap their experience to determine whether a given fact—if
proven—makes a violation more severe than the average crime in
the rare but inevitable situation where the legislature has not
specifically incorporated a factor into the guidelines.
Thus, Kansas has developed a system that allows juries to
determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts that subject
defendants to greater penalties, in compliance with Blakely. The
state’s sentencing guidelines are saved, as is the ability to depart
133. Id. § 21-4718(b)(4).
134. Id. The six-juror-minimum requirement is based on the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by a “jury.” The Court has
held that the right to a twelve-person jury is not embodied in the Sixth
Amendment, and a six-person jury is sufficient to comply with the defendant’s
constitutional rights. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99–103 (1970). Cf. Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (holding that a five-person jury does not comply with
a defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.)
135. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718(b)(2)–(4).
136. Id.; see also State v. Martin, 87 P.3d 337, 340 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004)
(determining that a defendant’s role as the mastermind of the crime is a valid
reason for upward departure, even though the reason for departure was
articulated by the judge and not the legislature).
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from them in those cases where aggravating factors are known
prior to trial, which provides flexibility that makes salvaging the
137
guidelines a worthwhile endeavor.
2.

Voluntary “Sentencing Guidelines”

Because voluntary sentencing guidelines survive Blakely, their
provisions and limitations are also worth examining.
Like
Minnesota, the Virginia legislature created a sentencing guidelines
commission (the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, or
138
for the purpose of “assist[ing] the judiciary” in the
VCSC)
imposition of sentences that are “appropriate and just” and make
139
the most efficient use of correctional resources.
Because the
guidelines are voluntary, Virginia’s judges are not required to give
the VCSC’s guidelines and efforts any practical effect.
The VCSC developed a series of worksheets for “serious”
140
141
crimes.
Each crime is assigned a score.
The VCSC also
assigned scores to various facts relating to the commission of a
142
crime.
Findings relating to whether a defendant possessed a
weapon at the time of the offense, has a prior criminal record,
and/or committed the offense while on parole or probation all
143
have specified point values.
The sum of the points for the given
crime plus the value of any additional facts found comprises the
144
Each total score has a corresponding
defendant’s total score.
recommended sentence and the VCSC deems a sentence “in
compliance” with the guidelines if it is within five percent of the
145
presumptive sentence.
In all felony cases other than class one

137. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is
Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 861 (1992) (“Departures are . . .
essential to the proper functioning of [a] [g]uidelines system [because] [t]hey
permit differentiation that could otherwise be achieved only through unstructured
discretion [and] [t]hey [also] permit relatively consistent treatment of atypical
situations and the development of coherent principles for deciding unusual
cases.”).
138. 1998 Va. Acts ch. 872.
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-801 (Michie 2003).
140. See www.vcsc.state.va.us/worksheets.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. VA. CRIM. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2003 23 (2003), at
www.vcsc.state.va.us/2003Annualreport_pdf.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter 2003 VCSC ANNUAL REPORT].
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felonies, sentencing judges are instructed by statute to file a written
146
explanation of any departure from the record of a case.
While the structure and goals of Virginia’s guidelines appear
similar to Minnesota’s, their implementation has notable
differences. First, a judge’s failure to file a written explanation of a
departure, or to follow all provisions of the state’s guidelines,
affords a defendant no right to review on appeal or any other form
147
148
of post-conviction relief. Sentencing judges are free to impose
a punishment outside the guidelines, but within the statutory
maximum, for any reason—or no reason. For example, a judge
may depart upward simply because, in the judge’s opinion, the
presumptive sentence for a given crime is “too low,” and such
blatant disregard for the guidelines will stand so long as the
149
sentence falls below the statutory maximum. Moreover, appellate
courts will not revise sentences reached by incorrect application of
the guidelines—so long as the sentence remains below the statutory
maximum—even if the misapplication increases the defendant’s
150
punishment beyond the “proper” guideline sentence.
In practice, Virginia’s guidelines are entirely advisory and do
not bind a court. Because of the truly voluntary nature of
Virginia’s guidelines, sentencing is analogous to indeterminate
sentencing because no facts—beyond those establishing guilt—are
essential to the imposition of a given punishment. This is the
151
precise reason that voluntary guidelines survive Blakely.
Judges
are free to depart from the guidelines because they do not respect
them, because they cannot competently apply them, or for no
ostensible reason whatsoever, and a defendant has no grounds for
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(B) (2004).
147. Id. See also Runyon v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 872 (Va. Ct. App.
1999). Cf. State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn. 2003) (holding that if a
judge does not find facts justifying a sentencing departure and state the reasons
for departure on the record at the time of sentencing, no departure is allowed).
148. Virginia allows for jury-imposed criminal sentences; the state’s sentencing
guidelines are only utilized by judges in imposing sentences.
149. Burpo v. Commonwealth, No. 2831-02-2, 2004 WL 555438 at *1–2 (Va. Ct.
App. March 23, 2004).
150. See Lutrell v. Commonwealth, 592 S.E.2d 752 (Va. Ct. App. 2004)
(applying harsher sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, rather
than at the time of the offense, is not a basis to overturn a sentence below the
statutory maximum).
151. In striking down the mandatory United State Sentencing Guidelines
pursuant to Blakely, the Supreme Court remedially altered the guidelines to
effectively make them voluntary and thus preserve, in part, the existing guidelines
system. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005).
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appeal based on the guidelines’ implementation. While the VCSC
specifies factors that are relevant or irrelevant to punishment and
gauges a crime’s seriousness in light of the state’s resources,
ultimately the VCSC’s work only provides judges with a frame of
reference to help establish a sentence that is fair and reasonable in
light the VCSC’s goals and studies.
VII. THE EXPERIENCES OF KANSAS AND VIRGINIA
A. Kansas: A Short Track Record of Success
Evaluating which scheme to implement in response to the
Blakely decision necessarily requires a close examination of the
success each state has had in achieving uniformity, proportionality,
and effective allocation of correction resources. Kansas’s present
statutory scheme for upward departures only became effective in
June of 2002. Consequently, there is no appreciable amount of
literature or data regarding its costs or overall effects. The most
significant problem the state experienced in revising its guidelines
seems to have been finding a way to deal with aggravated sentence
departures that were not final at the time of Gould, but prior to the
152
time the statutory amendments took effect.
152. In one case during that timeframe, a defendant pled guilty to the
aggravated battery charge and admitted as part of his plea bargain that—had the
matter been to a jury trial—the jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that he had manifested excessive brutality (an aggravating fact) in committing the
offense. State v. Santos-Garzo, 72 P.3d 560, 560–61 (Kan. 2003). Given the
defendant’s admission, the district court issued a sentence five months longer
than the guidelines’ uppermost range. Id. at 561. Nonetheless, on appeal, the
Kansas Supreme Court vacated the sentence because the upward durational
departure was issued pursuant to unamended section 21-4716, which the court
had found unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 564. Because no constitutionally
compliant procedure was in place to impose an upward durational departure, the
majority ruled that no court had the ability to issue an aggravated sentence, even
with the defendant’s admission in the case; aggravated sentences could only be
imposed after the legislature had responded with a constitutional procedural
scheme. Therefore, the case was remanded for sentencing within the guidelines.
Id.
The MSGC, in its initial report to the governor discussing Blakely’s impact in
Minnesota, recommended:
[T]he state [should] move cautiously and thoughtfully as it explores
potential changes to the current sentencing system,” and that “it may be
more prudent for the judiciary, prosecutors and defense attorneys to
develop temporary interim policies and procedures that are advisory in
nature for conducting bifurcated jury trials . . . and sentencing
procedures that impact the areas or sentencing . . . affected by [Blakely].
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However, once the transition to the new departure procedure
was made, the literature and data available indicate that Kansas’s
experience has not been a failure. The guidelines, and ability to
depart from them, have been preserved. The costs of preserving
the guidelines, although largely unknown, appear not to have been
prohibitive. In the two years the amended aggravated departure
procedure has been in effect, no reports indicate that the state has
experienced an explosion in bifurcated jury trials or an
unmanageable load of trials straining judicial resources. Further,
no significant movement is underway to implement an alternative
system. The manageable costs of the state’s new procedure are
possibly a result of several factors.
The first and most important fact is that the majority of
criminals nationwide plead guilty to the crimes charged. Given
that over ninety percent of criminal cases are settled by plea
bargains, the practical effect of forcing additional facts to be found
by juries is minimal when juries are not implicated in the vast
153
majority of cases in the first instance. Because there are relatively
few criminal cases that actually involve a jury trial, only a limited
number potentially involve substantial and compelling
circumstances that might cause prosecutors to seek an aggravated
154
departure. From the small subset of cases that involve a jury trial
and aggravating circumstances, presumably a number of those
cases can have all facts fairly decided by a single jury using a special
155
verdict, as Kansas’s guidelines provide.
For example, fairness
MSGC SHORT TERM RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 101, at 13. If Minnesota courts
adopt the view of the Santos-Garzo court, any such temporary interim policies and
procedures could be deemed ineffective for allowing aggravated sentencing
departures until the MSGC or the legislature makes a formal response to Blakely,
which, as the MSGC’s report indicates, is not likely to occur in the near future.
153. See, e.g., Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 205, 254 n.2 (1999) (noting that approximately ninety-two percent of
cases in the federal judicial system are resolved by plea bargains, and state figures
run up to ninety-seven percent, in the case of Colorado).
154. The MSGC estimates that only seventy-nine criminal cases in 2002
involved a jury trial and an aggravated durational departure. MSGC SHORT TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 101, at 6. Overall, 358 Minnesota cases in 2003
involved contested dispositional or durational departures. MSGC LONG TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 97, at 9.
155. By allowing judges to decide if justice demands a bifurcated trial, Kansas’s
system mitigates the possible realization of Justice Breyer’s concern regarding
defendants being placed in untenable positions disputing an array of facts
regarding whether, where, how and in what capacity one committed a crime. For
such complex situations, the bifurcated process can be utilized. However, because
the bifurcated process is only used in such complex situations, the overall number
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likely will not require a separate trial to determine whether a victim
is particularly vulnerable, a leading cause of aggravated departures
156
in Minnesota, because the fact is normally clear (due to the
victim’s age or mental state) and undisputed. The seemingly
manageable expense of Kansas’s sentencing procedure is not
surprising given the very small number of cases that are likely to
involve the costly bifurcated jury trial that the Blakely dissenters fear
will cause many to shy away from a similar system.
Judicial interpretation of defendants’ Apprendi-rights has also
limited the costs associated with implementing Kansas’s scheme.
As in Minnesota, Kansas’s grid includes several boxes that contain
157
presumed stayed sentences of varying durations.
The Kansas
Supreme Court has pronounced that facts that may compel a court
to turn a presumed stayed sentence into an executed prison
sentence of the same length (a “dispositional departure”) need not
158
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
While the
159
decision’s logic can certainly be challenged —arguably, a prison
sentence is a greater punishment than a period of supervised
release—the rule in State v. Carr prevents some defendants from
being able to demand a bifurcated jury trial to determine all facts
160
relevant to the punishment.
Whether states that adopt the
of bifurcated trials—and the costs associated therewith—are minimized to some
extent while still allowing for departures and respecting defendants’ constitutional
rights.
156. Of the 274 aggravated durational departures in 2002, twelve percent
(thirty-four cases) were justified on the grounds that the victim of the crime was
particularly vulnerable. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINE COMM’N, 2002 SENTENCING
DEPARTURE DATA REPORT 18 (2004), at www.msgc.state.mn.us/Data%20Reports/
dep2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
157. See supra Part II.B.
158. State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843, 850 (Kan. 2002). The court reasoned that a
dispositional departure does not expose a defendant to a greater punishment than
that authorized by a jury conviction, but merely determines where an individual’s
sentence is supervised, and thus Apprendi applies only to upward durational
departures. Id. at 850.
159. See Steven J. Crossland, Comment, Durational and Dispositional Departures
Under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act: The Kansas Supreme Court’s Uneasy Passage
Through Apprendi-Land [State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843 (Kan. 2002)], 42 WASHBURN L.J.
687, 723 (2003) (“[T]here is no rational basis for the court to apply due process
guarantees solely to durational departures . . . [and Carr] is at odds with the spirit,
if not the letter, of the Apprendi decision.”). The MSGC has assumed that Carr was
wrongly decided and the protections of a jury and burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt also apply to strictly dispositional departures. MSGC LONG TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 97, at 10.
160. In Minnesota, for example, the latest sentencing data indicates that
approximately twenty cases involved contested upward dispositional departures.
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Kansas solution in Blakely’s wake agree with Carr’s logic remains to
be seen. In any case, the rule in Carr is another factor that has
minimized the potential number and cost of bifurcated trials in
Kansas.
Nonetheless, the newfound ability to challenge an aggravating
factor before a jury, and thereby subject it to a greater evidentiary
standard, would logically make some defendants more willing to
contest aggravating factors and cause some increase in the number
of cases taken to trial. Kansas’s experience thus far provides one
reason to believe no explosion in the number of jury trials will
ensue from implementation of a presumptive guideline scheme
pursuant to Blakely. The logical explanation behind this result
could lie in the fact that an aggravating factor simply represents one
additional fact a prosecutor must prove, or plea bargain with, in a
161
criminal case. Adding one additional fact to the equation will not
necessarily produce a major increase in the number of defendants
demanding jury trials such that complying with their constitutional
rights would be impossible. More likely, prosecutors will be more
reluctant to charge aggravating factors than at present and—
knowing the additional resources that would be required to obtain
the result sought through trial—will only do so if the aggravating
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY
STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDER SENTENCED IN 2002 39–40 (2004).
161. It is interesting to note that Blakely’s interpretation of Washington’s
guidelines system requires that only a single aggravating fact be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt for a sentencing departure of any duration—up to the
statutory maximum—to be constitutionally compliant. This is noteworthy because
once an aggravating fact—any aggravating fact—is proven to the jury, a judge’s
departure is allowed and no additional facts are essential to the sentence imposed.
Therefore, any additional aggravating facts a sentencing judge may consider in
sentencing cannot be used to challenge the punishment imposed because such
facts would only influence the judge’s decision. For example, under Kansas’s
present sentencing procedure, the prosecutor in State v. Gould, would have only
needed to prove to a jury that the victims were particularly vulnerable to have
allowed the extended sentence in the case to stand. This would have been easy
because the children’s ages were undisputed and could have been proven with
ease. Beyond proving that lone aggravating fact to the jury, the judge would have
been free to consider and find additional aggravating facts, such as whether or not
the defendant acted with “particular cruelty” (a fact that is much more difficult to
prove), when deciding how much to increase the defendant’s sentence. Blakely’s
result, which seems to allow judges to find additional aggravating factors under
presumptive guideline systems, appears to be illogical and to undermine the
protections Blakely superficially affords defendants. However, this oddity further
demonstrates that Blakely’s bright-line rule is simply a formal interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment’s text rather than an attempt to afford criminal defendants any
measure of practical insulation from judicial fact-finding or discretion.
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162

fact is clearly supported by strong evidence.
In such cases,
defendants would likely be willing to plead guilty to the aggravating
fact, say, to have other, less-supported charges dismissed or to
attempt to minimize the perceived increase in sentence the
163
aggravating fact warrants.
Regardless of the plausible
explanations, the overall result in Kansas to date appears to have
been a relatively controlled increase in monetary costs associated
with charging aggravating facts to a jury. The short track record,
scant data, and unclear logic underlying this result, however, make
tenuous any conclusions that the experience is a necessary result of
the respective procedure.
B. Voluntary Guidelines: A Long, but Abysmal, Track Record
While the principal concern with Kansas’s system is cost, states
that have voluntary guidelines are primarily concerned with the
practical effect those guidelines have to eliminate disparity and to
achieve a greater degree of proportionality in sentencing. To date,
the overall results are unimpressive. In Maryland, for example, the
state’s Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy (MSCCSP) states
the overall departure has historically been “high,” at around forty164
five percent over a ten-year period. The high departure rate is in
162. Such a practice could certainly be an effective way to limit the cost in
judicial resources that implementing a Kansas-like system could have. However, to
a certain extent, it will also lessen the degree to which the punishment fits a
criminal’s actual conduct if aggravating factors are only charged in a few clear
cases and at the prosecutor’s sole discretion.
163. In fact, theoretically, there could be a strong incentive for a defendant
charged with an aggravating factor to plead guilty to a greater crime in exchange
for having the aggravating factor dropped from the charge. Defendants would do
this to ensure that they receive sentence of defined duration within the guidelines
and eliminate the risk of contesting an aggravating fact, and losing, which creates
the potential for a significantly greater sentence all the way up to the statutory
maximum for the crime charged. Regardless of how Blakely was decided, the
extensive use of plea bargaining in criminal sentencing was not likely to change.
Given this fact, the social costs of having criminal sentences determined by
advocates in a plea bargain setting, rather than through an adversarial factdetermination process, is an interesting topic that is outside the scope of this Note.
Nonetheless, the theoretical incentive above, demonstrates the extent to which
aggravating factors are a “big-stick” in plea negotiations under presumptive
guidelines.
164. MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIM. SENTENCING POL’Y, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 5
(2003), at www.msccsp.org/publications/ar2003.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005)
[hereinafter MSCCSP 2003 ANNUAL REPORT]. The MSCCP emphasizes that
compliance with the guidelines has improved over time. For example, the overall
departure rate declined from 58% in 1999, to 51% in 2000, to 49% in 2001. MD.
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spite of the facts that (1) the state’s sentencing grid has a wide
165
sentencing range; (2) the state includes a probationary sentence
of any length as “within” the guidelines so long as probation is the
disposition in the appropriate grid box; and (3) since 2001, any
sentence agreed upon in a plea bargain is considered “within” the
guidelines, regardless of where the sentence falls on the state’s
166
grid.
In contrast, in 2002, Minnesota’s presumptive guidelines
yielded a seventy-three percent non-departure rate despite having
much narrower sentencing ranges, presumptive lengths for stayed
sentences and including plea bargain sentences as departures if
167
outside the standard range or dispositionally non-compliant.
Virginia’s voluntary guidelines seemingly have had greater
influence than Maryland’s. Defining compliance as any sentence
168
within five percent of the presumptive sentence, Virginia reports
STATE COMM’N ON CRIM. SENTENCING POL’Y, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2002), at
www.msccsp.org/pulications/ar2002.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). These
recent compliance rates remain, however, well above the MSCCP’s goal of a 33%
departure rate. Id. at II.
165. For example, the range of a sentencing near the middle of the state’s grid
(involving an offense score of “eight” and an offender score of “four”) provides for
a sentence anywhere from eight to fifteen years. As such, even sentences “within”
the state’s guidelines can be widely disparate with no clear explanation justifying
differences in sentences.
The state’s sentencing matrix is available at
www.msccsp.org/guidelines/matrices.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
166. MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIM. SENTENCING POL’Y, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 14
(2002), at www.msccsp.org/publications/ar2002.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
167. Almost ninety percent of aggravated dispositional departures are issued at
the request of defendants but nonetheless are categorized as departures by the
MSGC. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2002 28 (2004).
168. 2003 VCSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 23. At this Note’s print
deadline, Minnesota’s grid provided approximately a five percent range in most
boxes. For example, a defendant situated near the middle of the grid with a
criminal history score of three and an offense severity level of six faced a standard
range of thirty-seven to forty-one months (a 5.1% variance around the thirty-nine
month presumed sentence). Only in the most severe cases did Minnesota’s grid
provide for a standard range that is significantly less than five percent around the
presumed sentence; for example, the most severe box on the grid provides a range
of 419 to 433 months around a presumed sentence of 426 months (a 1.6%
variance above or below the presumed sentence).
In Blakely’s wake, however, the MSGC has proposed expanding the range
of presumptive sentences, likely to minimize the number of instances in which
prosecutors deem it necessary to pursue a complex and costly departure process
because a sentence within the presumptive range would not provide an
“appropriate” punishment. For example, a defendant with a criminal history score
of three and an offense severity level of six would face a standard range of thirtyfour to forty forty months on the proposed grid. The most severe box on the
proposed grid provides a range of 363 to 480 months. MINN. SENTENCING
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an almost eighty-percent compliance rate in 2003 for sentences
169
Thus, the VCSC’s efforts seem to have
imposed by judges.
influenced sentencing practices in the state. However, despite the
relatively high compliance rate, the VCSC also reports that in over
one-quarter of the cases involving departures, the sentencing judge
170
provided no explanation of the departure despite a statutory
171
Similarly, in Maryland between July and
requirement to so do.
December 2001, almost thirty percent of cases involving departures
172
contained no explanation of the reasons for the variant sentence.
Contrasting these figures with Minnesota’s present Guidelines,
which, pursuant to State v. Geller, require every departure to include
a written explanation of the reasons for the extraordinary sentence,
the transparency in sentencing under a voluntary system seems
173
low.
What do the figures from Maryland and Virginia indicate?
Among other things, they demonstrate that the effect voluntary
guidelines actually have on sentencing practice can vary greatly
from state-to-state. However, the overall consensus is that voluntary
guidelines are not very effective at reducing disparity or influencing
174
judicial discretion in determining sentence lengths.
In addition,
the common absence of reasons justifying departure-sentences
undermines the goal of achieving proportionality in sentencing; if
the reasons why a particular crime was more or less serious than the
“typical” crime remain unknown and unannounced, the guidelines
perceived ability to achieve a sentence proportional to the crime
suffers a serious credibility problem.
Voluntary sentencing
guidelines are likely not being considered as a possible response to
Blakely due in large part to their suspect historical ability to

GUIDELINES COMM’N, NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING TO CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS TO
THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED—
SEX
OFFENDER
GRID
7–9
(Dec.
2004),
at
PROPOSED
www.msgc.state.mn.us/Forms/pubheardec2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
169. 2003 VCSC ANNUAL REPORT 2003, supra note 145, at 24 (2003). Jury
sentences within the guidelines are much lower, likely due to society’s present
“tough-on-crime” stance.
170. Id. at 10.
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2004).
172. Steven Adler & Michael Connelly, Reasons for Judicial Departure in Maryland
Circuit Courts, July 2001-December 2001, SENTENCING FAX, December 6, 2002,
www.msccsp.org/publications/fax/fax111.pdf 1 (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
173. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
174. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Commissions and Their Guidelines, in 17 CRIME &
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 137, 140 (Michael Tonry, ed. 1993).
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effectively achieve policy goals of uniformity, proportionality, and
effective resource allocation.
VIII. THE CASE FOR MINNESOTA’S EXCEPTIONALISM
A. Why Voluntary Guidelines are Likely to Work in Minnesota
There are several logical reasons, however, to believe that
Minnesota is uniquely situated to make voluntary guidelines work
effectively. The Guidelines’ longevity in the state offers two crucial
advantages that would aid successful implementation of a voluntary
scheme. First, Minnesota’s judges have a deep familiarity with the
Guidelines, arising from their experience dealing with the
175
guidelines as a presumptive tool.
Maryland points to a lack of
knowledge regarding the guidelines as a principal reason for
176
judges’ common disregard for the guidelines in sentencing; and
177
both Maryland and Virginia identify ignorance as a main cause of
the judiciary’s laxity in providing justifications for departures.
Neither state has ever effected presumptive guidelines that have
forced judges to acquire knowledge of the respective guidelines.
However, that is not the case in Minnesota. Minnesota judges’
present familiarity with the Guidelines’ ranges and procedure likely
cause them to consult and implement voluntary guidelines as
intended by the legislature and MSGC, which is the first step
necessary to achieving the goals set forth by the MSGC.
Another reason Minnesota’s experience with its Guidelines
would help make a voluntary system work well is that the state’s
178
twenty-five year experience with them has been a success.
The
MSGC has conducted extensive research in evaluating the
seriousness of various crimes, the correctional resources available,
reasons that logically justify departure sentences and the overall
175. While conceding that the judiciary’s overall familiarity with the
Guidelines may diminish over time as seats on the bench turn over, an appreciable
amount of turnover will inevitably require a significant period of time. By the time
any appreciable turnover actually occurs, if voluntary guidelines prove ineffective
with newer judges, the state will nonetheless have afforded itself enough time to
perform a more comprehensive evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative
responses to Blakely. This ability to perform a better analysis of alternatives further
demonstrates the prudence of enacting voluntary guidelines as an immediate
response to Blakely. See infra Part IX.
176. MSCCP 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 164, at 17.
177. VCSC 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 9–11.
178. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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theory of punishment for the state. Recognizing the MSGC’s
dedication to providing a coherent sentencing policy and
procedure, Minnesota’s judges are especially likely to respect the
purpose the Guidelines serve, whether they are voluntary or not.
Further, in light of the overall respect generated from the state’s
positive experience with the Guidelines to date, judges would
presumably give guideline sentencing ranges serious consideration
to continue the positive trend in punishment that has emerged in
this state.
The final reason to believe that voluntary guidelines could
work in Minnesota is that, in contrast to the federal judiciary, the
electorate can monitor judges’ sentencing practices through
elections to ensure that the public’s policy for punishment is being
179
implemented through the judiciary.
Careful monitoring of
sentencing practices under a voluntary scheme—through the
MSGC and/or private groups—could detect any appreciable return
of unjustifiably disparate, harsh, lenient, or disproportional
sentencing by members of the judiciary. Assuming the Guidelines
remain a valid expression of the state’s public policy to eliminate
such practices, judges who disregard a voluntary form of the
Guidelines would not likely pervade the judiciary because the
populace could replace judges who disregard voluntary guidelines
with individuals who express a respect for, and intent to follow, the
180
Guidelines system in place. Combined with the benefits that flow
from judges’ experience with—and respect for—the Guidelines,
the opportunity to monitor sentencing practices justifies a degree
of optimism for voluntary guidelines.

179. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
180. George W. Soule, Chairman of the Minnesota Commission on Judicial
Selection, has observed, “Typically, a judge has trouble in winning election only if
he or she has drawn some public notoriety during the term.” Robert J. Sheran &
Douglas K. Amdahl, Minnesota Judicial System: Twenty-five Years of Radical Change, 26
HAMLINE L. REV. 219, 281 (2003). Publicity of blatant disregard for the guidelines
and the negative consequences that accompany such disregard—either in the
form of increased costs to the state caused by inexplicable upward departures, or
the notoriously “soft on crime” label that accompanies unjustifiable downward
departures—could create the notoriety necessary to allow a qualified candidate
advocating adherence to the Guidelines to mount a legitimate challenge. One role
for the MSGC in the context of a voluntary guidelines setting could be to track
and disseminate information relating to unexplained departures. Such a check
would allow judicial elections to perform their task, as described by Coase, of
providing a “mechanism to remove judges from office who are not performing
well.” Id.
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B. Why Adopting Voluntary Guidelines Is Prudent Now
Criminal sentencing procedure is at a crossroads because of
Blakely. The Minnesota legislature certainly intended to limit
judicial discretion through its initial creation of the MSGC and
implementation of a guidelines scheme. Blakely now forces the
legislature to modify the established guidelines system and either
further restrict judicial authority by removing consideration of
aggravating factors from the bench’s purview, or return a degree of
judicial discretion that could be channeled by the efforts of a
commission specifically dedicated to analyzing criminal
punishment.
Superficially, a system modeled after Kansas’s seems to be the
next logical step in the path of criminal sentencing, in which
judicial sentencing discretion has been steadily curtailed through
181
legislation and judicial interpretation over the past two decades.
Such a measure can be seen as the best way to preserve the positive
effects the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines have had in this state.
Certainly, a Kansas-based approach is a legitimate response to
Blakely.
However, limiting judicial sentencing discretion is not a goal
in and of itself. Rather, it is properly viewed as a means to an end,
which is the accomplishment of the goals established by the MSGC.
Overall, a voluntary guidelines system is superior to a Kansas-styled
scheme because a voluntary system is likely to be equally effective
while involving less cost and risk than the Kansas alternative.
Moreover, a voluntary scheme would more closely follow the
182
legislature’s express policy underlying the Guidelines.
Modifying Minnesota’s Guidelines to permit greater judicial
discretion through voluntary guidelines would likely function in
181. Justice Scalia’s opinion indicates his belief that Kansas-modeled systems
will be the most logical and popular response to Blakely in states that have
implemented presumptive guidelines. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531,
2541 (2004). See also United States v. Booker, Nos. 04-104, 04-105, 2005 WL 50108,
at *47–48 (U.S. S. Ct. Jan. 12, 2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority
approach in Booker allowing United State Sentencing Guidelines to stand in
voluntary form as judicial disregard for Congress’s intent in passing Guidelines).
The MSGC has recommended that Governor Pawlenty effect a system roughly
based on Kansas’s model for aggravated departures.
MSGC LONG TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 97, at 16.
182. It also needs to be noted that truth-in-sentencing can be implemented
regardless of the presumptive or voluntary nature of sentencing guidelines, and
the benefit in the area of correctional resource allocation can be reaped
regardless of the path a state chooses to follow.
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the same practical manner and achieve success similar to that
which the state has experienced with prescriptive guidelines over
183
the past twenty years. In addition to being effective, maintaining
the present Guidelines’ procedures in voluntary form has the
distinct advantage of being less costly on several fronts than the
Kansas alternative.
First, such an approach would allow the familiar sentencing
procedure at the trial level to continue essentially unchanged, thus
avoiding many of the efforts necessary to enact a new scheme,
educate the judiciary on the new procedure, gain the experience
needed to efficiently implement it, and expend the energy that
would necessarily accompany clarifying its application.
The
challenges to clarify Apprendi’s application to dispositional
departures, the sufficiency of process in potentially having
184
aggravating factors found by smaller-sized juries, and any number
of other issues that inevitably accompany a new procedure are all
costs that could also be avoided by simply transforming the present
185
presumptive scheme into a voluntary one.
Further, and most directly related to monetary costs, following
Kansas’s system amounts to writing a blank check to cover an
unknown amount of additional judicial expenses that will
accompany a presumably greater amount of jury trials of greater
length and complexity. Although one can point to the fact that
Kansas’s system has not imploded, a single example with such a
short track record should hardly inspire overwhelming confidence
183. See discussion supra, Part VIII.A.
184. The continuing validity of Williams v. Florida could be questioned in light
of the present Court’s strong desire to maximize the role of the jury in criminal
cases.
185. One especially troubling issue in implementing a revised procedure for
aggravated departures in Minnesota would be adopting the MSGC’s proposal to
allow judges, sua sponte, to seek such a departure. See MSGC LONG TERM
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 97, at 14. The recommendation to give judges such
power is likely a response to criticisms that Kansas’s system gives prosecutors too
much discretion in ultimately determining defendants’ sentences by virtue of the
ability to charge, not charge, or drop aggravating factors; thus, punishments can
be seen as being determined by prosecutorial discretion rather than the severity of
the crime committed. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1168–70 (2001).
However, the MSGC recognizes the potential for challenges to such a provision as
a violation of separation of powers; the sua sponte option would provide the judicial
branch with limited influence in the prosecution of crimes, a function reserved for
the executive. In addition, it is difficult to imagine an efficient, effective, and
practical means to prosecute an aggravating factor at the court’s demand after the
prosecutor has refused to do the same.
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in the long-term viability of the system. Justice O’Connor refers to
the majority’s decision as imposing a constitutional tax on
186
guidelines systems. There is no reason Minnesota should rush to
pay a “constitutional tax” of an indefinite amount by implementing
a bifurcated-trial guidelines system when a “non-taxable” voluntary
guidelines system is likely to achieve the same desired results.
Finally, in examining how the state’s response to Blakely can
best follow the spirit of the present Guidelines, it is important to
note that Minnesota’s laws, at present, clearly provide that
sentencing pursuant to the Guidelines is not a right that accrues to
a convicted felon. Rather, the Guidelines are a procedure based on
187
the public policy of achieving the MSGC’s goals. Kansas’s system
directly contradicts the legislature’s express vision of the Guidelines
by making a sentence within the Guidelines a felon’s right, which
could only be taken away by knowing and voluntary waiver or proof
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of some aggravating fact.
Voluntary guidelines, in contrast, create no such right. A voluntary
system would recognize that Minnesota has a clear public policy for
sentencing, but that guidelines are truly a tool to use in the
sentencing process, not an expansion of felons’ rights.
In light of the present justification for the Guidelines’
existence, a voluntary system would more closely comport with the
legislature’s apparent philosophy for having guidelines than a
Kansas-style system would. A voluntary system, therefore, is the
most logical successor to the present system and should be
implemented to allow the Guidelines to continue to successfully
function as they have in the past.
IX. CONCLUSION
Surely other states’ legislatures, and possibly the United States
Congress, will follow the yellow brick road to a Kansas-modeled
guidelines system. In cases such as the federal system, in which
sentencing guidelines are presently reviled, such a path is likely the
best approach to ensure a tool is in place to minimize disparate or
disproportional sentencing. However, not all jurisdictions are
similarly situated and therefore there is no universal “best” or “most
logical” response to Blakely. In light of Minnesota’s unique
186. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2546 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
187. See MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2004).
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experience with its Guidelines, the time is ripe for a swing in the
pendulum back toward greater judicial discretion in sentencing,
aided and directed by the efforts of the MSGC and supplemented
by continuing the state’s implementation of truth-in-sentencing.
By gauging the experience other jurisdictions have with such a
system, and monitoring the resources such a system requires over
an appreciable time, Minnesota would be in a position down the
road to intelligently perform a cost-benefit analysis of this system
when its effects are better known. Presently, however, maintaining
the guideline procedures in voluntary form is the legislature’s best
available option when reconstructing part of the sentencing system
Blakely tore down.
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